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The Armed Forces of the United States are becoming more expeditionary in 
nature, in that more forces will be home-ported or home-stationed in the Continental U.S.  
One of the major characteristics associated with future military concepts is that they 
employ Joint and Coalition Forces from a sea base conducting a full range of operations 
in the littoral regions of the world.  A key aspect of conducting operations is the 
sustainment of forces in a sea based environment.  Future logistical architectures 
associated with providing that sustainment will be joint and integrated to provide 
seamless support to all forces operating in and around the sea base.  The ordering system 
associated with that future logistical architecture must be robust, redundant, and not have 
a single point of failure.  The ordering and tracking of all sustainment supplies through 
the supply chain distribution system will be important in ensuring that supplies are 
delivered to the right place and time to guarantee success.  
This thesis proposes to emphasize a functional architecture for an Expert Ordering 
System in a Sea Based environment that will reduce the overall logistical manpower 
requirements of the Joint/Combined Force.  Use cases of different realistic scenarios will 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The research will take an intensive look into the doctrine of current Service 
Centric logistics practices and develop an operational view of an expert system’s 
architecture that supports Joint/Combined Logistics management, in a Sea Based as well 
as a Land Based environment.  The research will address concerns associated with the 
ordering and reordering process for forces operating in a sea based environment.  The 
objective of the research will be to analyze the concept of the use of an expert system to 
increase efficiency in the logistics supply chain, and thereby offer the opportunity to 
reduce the manpower ratio associated with this process.  
 
A. BACKGROUND 
“Amateurs study tactics, Professionals study logistics.”-Old Soldiers Proverb 
(Stephens, 2002) 
"Throughout the struggle, it was in his logistic inability to maintain his armies in 
the field that the enemy's fatal weakness lay." -Dwight D. Eisenhower (Department of the 
Navy, 1997) 
Logistics is a complicated multifunctional task, which must be mastered to win 
battles in conflict as well as in business.  The only difference is that the military focuses 
on life and death, while business measures profit. (Pagonis, 1992, p.210)  Throughout 
history, military conflicts have been decided on and off the battlefield.  The winner was 
not always the best tactician.  The leader with the most staying power and who could 
afford to expend the most men and material usually prevailed.  For instance, in the War 
Between the States, the Confederacy was noted for having the best military leaders but 
the Union had superior logistics and could afford to take losses while still moving 
forward.  In today's environment, logistics is the careful integration of transportation, 
supply, warehousing, maintenance, procurement, contracting, and automation, organized 
into a coherent functional area. (Pagonis, 1992, p.2) 
The information age is having a significant impact on all aspects of warfare, and 
logistics is no exception. (Department of the Navy, 1997)  The results of these 
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information age innovations are reducing the percentage of force required to deliver the 
increasing logistic support needed for an expeditionary force.  Better management of 
information leads to greater responsiveness and efficiency in the provision of logistical 
support. (Department of the Navy, 1997)  It has been proposed that the use of expert 
systems in the naval concept of "Sea Basing" will be a force multiplier (create synergy) 
and could benefit the armed forces of the United States as a whole.   
 
1. History of Logistics 
“Logistics is the ‘practical art of moving armies.’” − General Antonie Henri 
Jomini (Cox, 2002) 
Logistics is an integral part of business and warfare.  It has been so since time 
immemorial. (Department of the Navy, 1997)  It ensures the effective use of limited 
resources. (Department of the Navy, 1997) In business, logistics is the management of the 
supply chain and all of the human and mechanical aspects associated with the supply 
chain, from the manufacturer, to the purchaser of the finished goods, through the disposal 
of the goods.  In warfare, logistics is the sustainment of a military force in the field of 
combat. Logistics is both an art and a science.  It is a science because it is rooted in 
known facts, relationships and rules. (Department of the Navy, 1997)   It is the science of 
planning and carrying out movement and maintenance of forces. (Department of the 
Navy, 1997)  Logistics is an art in the sense that it is creative in its application of 
scientific knowledge. (Department of the Navy, 1997) 
Supplying an army in the field has changed drastically since the advent of modern 
warfare.  In the earliest recorded warfare, every man had to look out for himself.  Troops 
were expected to feed themselves and live off of the land. (Department of the Navy, 
1997)  The Industrial Age and the advent of mass production along with greatly improved 
transportation systems allowed armies to stockpile goods and create a proverbial logistics 
mountain, commonly referred to as the “Iron Mountain.”  That mountain of supplies and 
material would then be pushed forward to troops on the front lines.  
Support from the sea was used extensively during the Second World War.  
Amphibious operations such as those conducted in North Africa, Normandy and the 
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Philippines were major assault and sustainment operations.  Ships carried troops and 
supplies over long distances and deposited them on hostile shores.  They unloaded their 
cargo at ports or on a secure beach.  All of the material was unloaded and stacked on the 
beachhead.  Supplies and personnel replacements were pushed forward to replenish the 
losses sustained in an attrition style and later a maneuver style of warfare. Up to 700 tons 
per day of supplies were required to sustain a fighting division in contact with the enemy.  
During defensive operations most of the tonnage requirement was dedicated to 
ammunition.  In offensive maneuver operations, petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) 
were the majority of the supplies consumed. (Eisenhower, 1950, p.290)    The logistical 
doctrine observed at that time required that amphibious assault forces had an initial basic 
load of supplies with subsequent re-supply of critical expendable supplies such as water, 
fuel, ammunition and food. (Parsons, 1999, p.1174)    All assault divisions were required 
to carry 3 days or 2100 tons of supplies with them into battle.  The logistical support 
needed to replace those expended supplies was then pushed forward from ships to the 
beachhead.  From the beachhead, the supplies were funneled to the combat units that 
needed them the most. 
Since the Persian Gulf War of the early 1990's, logisticians have studied and 
improved their logistics systems.  This has primarily been accomplished through the use 
of personal computers along with improved transportation and communication systems.  
The military logistic systems of today are more agile and anticipatory than their 
predecessors.  A "Just-In-Time" logistics system is envisioned, where supplies and 
services are pushed, by anticipation, or pulled, by user request, through the supply chain.  
All in all, just-in-time logistics is still a concept that is being studied and modified in a 
peacetime environment, in an effort to reduce the "logistics mountain" required for an 
overwhelming victory against an unknown threat.  Logisticians work with the intelligence 
community to identify unknowns in warfare. They then attempt to mitigate the risks 
associated with these unknowns. (Pagonis, 1992, p.2) 
 
2. Sea Power 21 
Sea Power 21 is an overarching conceptual framework in which a force at sea can 
prosecute the national goals of the United States and ensure dominance over any 
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adversary.  It takes into account three dynamic components: Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and 
Sea Basing. (Clark, 2002, pp. 32-41)  The fourth component, ForceNet, integrates these 
three components. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Sea Power 21 from (Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command [MCCDC], 2004) 
 
a. Sea Shield  
Sea Shield is the ability to protect a force at sea from surface, subsurface, 
air and ballistic missiles as well as “projecting global defensive assurance”. (Clark, 2002, 
pp. 32-41)  The concept is based on the use of specific vessels for defensive missions 
combined with other vessels used primarily for offense.  The mission critical logistical 
ships will utilize little, if any, defensive armament, and so will require the full protection 






b. Sea Strike  
Sea Strike is the ability to project power in the form of manpower, 
munitions and information in an offensive manner. (Clark, 2002, pp. 32-41)  That power 
must be precise and persistent in nature.  Sea Strike is the hammer which provides the 
threat to an adversary to ensure his acquiescence to our national interest or capitulation if 
desired.  Sea Strike also acts as a deterrent to potentially hostile nations who are 
considering attacks on our countries or our allies. 
c. Sea Basing  
Sea Basing is the ability to operate at sea for an undetermined amount of 
time and provide “joint operational independence”. (Clark, 2002, pp. 32-41)  It provides 
freedom of maneuver in an unconstrained environment free of limitation imposed by land 
based logistical sites located in Host Nations.  The United States Navy and other naval 
forces have accomplished Sea Basing on numerous occasions in the past but in a limited 
fashion.    
d. Force Net  
Force Net is the informational and architectural network which binds all 
three of the components into the viable concept of Sea Power. (Clark, 2002, pp. 32-41) It 
will provide the ability to align the system of systems and increase the potency of a force 
at sea without an unnecessary increase in size.  It will assist in optimizing solutions and 




The United States Armed Forces are always preparing for the next conflict.  One 
of the concepts of operations (CONOPS) to prepare for that next conflict is Sea Basing, 
which is one of the pillars of the US Navy’s Sea Power 21.  Sea based logistics is the 
process of supporting operations ashore and at sea from at-sea platforms. It reduces or 
eliminates the logistical support footprint on land and enhances the speed and flexibility 
of maneuver forces. The ultimate goal is to put the maximum amount of warfighters 
(combat troops) on the ground using the minimum amount of logistical support required 
to achieve the mission goals. Sea based logistics must be able to support all of the naval 
6 
ships as well as the forces conducting the amphibious operation.  The goal is to 
accomplish the logistical support with the least amount of resources.  Future sea basing 
must be efficient, flexible and reduce the need to build up a logistics stockpile on the 
beach. (Secretary of the Navy, 2003)  To accomplish the goals of future conflicts the 
Armed Forces are trying to bring more combat force to bear on the threat located in the 
littoral regions of the world while reducing the logistics forces currently required to 
maintain that combat force.  A possible partial solution to reducing logistical manpower 
requirements and speeding up the throughput of supplies to the combat forces is the use 
of an expert system that tracks, maintains, orders and reorders all classes of supply.  
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Through this paper, we will analyze and answer the following questions: 
1. What are the some of the problems/challenges in the current Service 
Centric Logistics system?  
2. What are some of the lessons learned/ heuristics in Logistics since World 
War II and how can they be implemented into an expert ordering system? 
3. Starting with the initial problem of ordering and reordering supplies, will a 
functional decomposition lead to the concept of an expert system? 
4. Could an Expert System be used to order and reorder all classes of supply? 
5. Is an expert system a logical solution to reducing the manning effort for 
ordering and reordering supplies? 
 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
By answering these questions, we hope to bring a better understanding of where 
the armed forces are today with supply ordering, and give a positive direction for where 
we can go from here.  The concept of using Expert Systems to order supplies is certainly 
not new, but as the reader reads this thesis, we hope he or she will gain a better 
understanding of what challenges have been faced in the past, and how those challenges 
might be overcome. 
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E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will emphasize a functional architecture for an Expert Ordering 
System in a Sea Based environment that could potentially reduce the overall logistical 
manpower requirements of the Joint/Combined Force.  The emphasis is not on writing 
code or producing a program.  It will be on analyzing the potential benefits of an expert  
system for ordering and reordering all classes of supply.  Operational Models along with 
activity diagrams of realistic operations will be produced to show one possible solution to 
the problem. 
 
1. Expert Systems in General 
“Expert System: A class of computer programs that can advise, analyze, 
categorize, communicate, consult, design, diagnose, explain, explore, forecast, form 
concepts, identify, intercept, justify, learn, manage, monitor, plan, present, retrieve, 
schedule, test, and tutor.  They address problems normally thought to require human 
specialists for their solutions.” (Firebaugh, 1988, p.335)   
Essentially, an expert system is an automated computer system that acts as a 
replacement for a “real person”.  The computer system has a database to draw on with a 
set of logical and heuristic business processes, imbedded in it.  When a specific situation 
arises, such as the inventory level of a specific item gets below a certain level, the system 
puts in a requisition for the item, but there is more to it than that.  This expert system can 
also review the ordering rate, and based on the ordering rate, or the defense condition 
level, or  on location, may adjust the level at which supplies are ordered.  The ability to 
adapt to the changing environments as a real person would is the key to a successful 
expert system. 
 
2. Architectures Views in General 
The problem or challenge must first be defined before a solution can be found.  
Part of defining the problem, is bounding the problem.  The Systems Architecture does 
exactly this.  One of the primary purposes of the systems architecture is to define exactly 
where the problem is bounded, and how the solution will address each part of the 
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problem.  This architecture can take several different views.  Each is of the same system, 
but shows different information. 
a. Operational 
“Operational View: This view describes the tasks and activities, 
organizational and operational elements, and information flows required to accomplish or 
to support military or consultation function.” (Moxley, 2001) 
The operational architectural view represents the tasks and processes 
required to accomplish the goal.  These process diagrams a specific process such as 
“ordering supplies” and systemically walks through the steps.  At each step, the activity is 
identified and the person or system performing that activity is identified.   
b. System 
“System View: This view is generated from the Operational View by the 
responsible host nation or design authority. It describes and identifies the system(s), both 
internal and external, and interconnections required to accomplish or to support the 
military or consultation function. This view maps information flows, hardware, and 
applications to user locations and specifies the connectivity, performance, and other 
constraints.” (Moxley, 2001) 
The system architectural view focuses on the specific steps and processes 
performed by the system.  The system view shows interaction between various pieces of 
software, and helps to define the interfaces between the software applications. One key 
output generated from the operational view activity diagrams and depicted in the systems 
architectural view, are interfaces.  Interfaces are important because the interaction 
between the system and the human are the primary focuses for Human Systems 
Engineering.  The systems view also helps to define the separation and interfaces 
between the solution and the outside environment.  The systems view will describe the 
internal operation of the expert ordering system and provide the location of interaction 






“Technical View: This view, generated by the host nation or equivalent 
authority, describes the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of the elements of 
the system and takes into account the technical constraints imposed by the Systems View. 
It provides the minimal set of rules governing the selection of the appropriate standards 
and products from the implementation domain.” (Moxley, 2001) 
The technical architectural view utilizes information from the operational 
and systems view to set limits and technical constraints.  This helps to keep the 
architecture based in reality and not to excessive in scope.  The technical view will set the 
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II. REVIEW OF CURRENT JOINT/COMBINED LOGISTICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“Behind every great leader there was an even greater logistician.” − Michael Cox. 
(Cox, 2002) 
 Many of the logistical systems used in modern day combat operations, at sea, on 
land and in the air, are incremental improvements of legacy systems dating back to World 
War II.    The Iron Mountain associated with military logistics still exists but is of 
somewhat smaller form and logistics remains a “slow and cumbersome” process. (Keeter, 
2004)  This was painfully evident during the logistical buildup for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  It was the largest since the preparation for the Normandy invasion in 1944. 
(Keeter, 2004)  Once maneuver operations commenced, the Marine logistics information 
systems, which in some cases are 30 years old, were unable to meet the needs of the 
widespread and rapidly moving combat units. (Barnard, 2004)   
One of the more significant improvements to military logistics systems came with 
the incorporation of the personal computer and the internet.  The modern logistician uses 
many innovative and technical tools not envisioned in the days of World War II, Korea, 
and Vietnam.  The throughput of logistics from the manufacturer to the end-user has 
improved along with improvements of the distribution systems.  Technical innovations 
have improved the speed and efficiency associated with requesting supplies but not 
necessarily quality of logistical support provided.  For example, if a National Stock 
Number (NSN) is submitted incorrectly or a shipping label is misprinted or put in the 
wrong place, the wrong item could be shipped to the wrong place at a very respectable 
speed.  Another issue is that units relocate but fail to complete all of the paperwork 
associated with changing the units’ Department of Defense Activity Address Code 
(DoDAAC) or Routing Identifier Code (RIC).  The requested supplies are acquired and 
shipped but to the wrong place or to the wrong supporting unit. This increase in 
throughput has resulted in an increase in overall number of errors, requiring additional 
resources to correct. 
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Tracking systems have been established such as Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID), where a conscientious logistician can mind the progress of requested supplies 
through the supply chain distribution system. This can accomplished with web-based 
applications that are relatively user friendly.  Tracking is also accomplished with the use 
of legacy information systems that require a trained operator to constantly query a data 
base for updated status. 
All of the current logistical systems work within a framework associated with the 
Joint Logistical Functions and the Classes of Supply.  This framework has been 
established so that like items and services can be more efficiently managed by a group or 
section that can concentrate on those particular commodities. 
 
B. JOINT LOGISTICAL FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND THE CLASSES OF 
SUPPLY 
A basic, top-level frame work has been established that encompasses the logistical 
functional areas as well as the Classes of Supply associated with those functional areas.  
These frameworks are used to organize and manage all of the supply requirements 
associated with a military force.  These functional areas and classes of supply allow 
military logisticians to focus on like or similar commodities.  The logistician tracks those 
supplies from their initial request or order by the user to the acquisition or allocation and 
then through the supply chain distribution system to the final delivery of the requisitioned 
item to the initial requester.  
 
1. Logistical Functional Areas 
There are six logistics functions defined in United States Armed Forces joint 
doctrine.  They are Supply, Maintenance, Health Service, Transportation, Services, and 
General Engineering (see Table 1). (Department of Army and Navy, 1996) These 
logistical functions are used to focus the logisticians tasked to provide the fighting force 






Supply Acquire, manage, receive, store and issue material to operating forces 
Maintenance Inspect, test, service, classify, repair, replace, reclaim, modify, convert, 
calibrate, rebuild and overhaul equipment for operating forces 
Health 
Services 
Evacuate, hospitalize, medical logistics, casualty collection, health 
maintenance, casualty treatment, medical laboratory service, blood 
management, vector control, preventative medicine service, veterinary 
service, and dental service to personnel in the operating force 
Transportation Move units, personnel, equipment and supplies for the operating forces 
Services Aerial delivery, laundry, clothing exchange and bath, and graves 
registration for operating forces 
General 
Engineering 
Construction, damage repair, and operation and maintenance of facilities 
for operating forces 
Table 1. Joint Logistics Functions (Department of Army and Navy, 
1996. p. IX-2) 
 
The functional areas break down logistics to a more finite and manageable level 
and correspond to the Classes of Supply that they manage or consume. Each functional 
area has one or more classes of supply linked with it, which are required to accomplish its 
associated mission.  
 
2. Classes of Supply 
There are ten Classes of Supply (see Table 2).  Military material is broken down 
into these well-defined areas or classes to aid in maintaining the responsibility of 
procurement and management of items in the supply chain. The classes of supply provide 
an additional framework for collectively managing all of the supplies required to 
maintain a fighting force in the field, in garrison or at sea.  They assist logisticians in 
focusing their efforts and providing the right supplies to the right unit.  The efforts 
associated with maintaining the flow are most evident in bulk commodities such as Class 
I, III, and V.  A fighting force on the offensive must maintain a sufficient flow of these 
classes of supply to sustain its momentum and accomplish its objectives. (See Appendix 






I Subsistence and comfort items 
II Clothing, individual equipment, and administrative supplies and equipment 
III Petroleum fuels and lubricants 
IV Construction and barrier materials 
V Ammunition 
VI Personal demand items 
VII Major end items 
VIII Medical material 
IX Repair parts 
X Material to support nonmilitary programs 
Misc. Water Salvage, and captured material 
Table 2. Classes of Supply (Department of Army, 2003, p. 6-3) 
 
Supplies are throughput from the source of supply/port of debarkation/sea base to 
the end user as much as possible.  (Department of Army, 2003, p. 6-2)  This reduces 
handling costs as well as shortens the time line associated with distributing the supplies to 
the unit most in need.  Most bulk commodities are “pushed” as far forward as possible 
before they are distributed to the end user.  Pushed items are more anticipatory in nature.  
The logistician relies on the common battlefield operating systems to see what operations 
will require the most supplies and anticipate the request and delivery of the supplies to 
ensure that there is not break in the operations tempo associated with that operation.  
They work closely with supported units to ensure that the required supplies are available 
when and where the end user needs them. 
More specific or special supply items are “pulled” forward by the end user.  They 
satisfy a specific need or a specific purpose and are not shipped or acquired until the end 
user has a valid requirement for that supply item.  It is difficult to anticipate exactly when 
something will break. Often, a repair part can only be identified after the system is 
broken.  Once that requirement is realized, the end user requests the item and it is shipped 
through the distribution system.         
3. How Logistical Architectures Support Warfighting 
“Combat Service Support” (CSS) is the activity that provides services and 
supplies to operating forces. (Department of Navy, 1997, p. 5) CSS is an indispensable 
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part of any operation.  Without CSS the tanks and trucks could not and would not move.  
Without mobility, a maneuver force becomes a target.  CSS provides all of the logistical 
functions at the tactical level, where the troops in the trenches need it the most.  CSS, as 
part of logistics, keeps the operating forces manned, armed, fueled, fixed, sustained and 
moved in a combat environment. (Department of Army and Navy, 1996)  Table 3 
integrates the Logistical Functional areas with the Classes of Supply to provide linkage of 
which supplies support each function. 
 
Table 3. Joint Logistics Functions and the Classes of Supply Associated 
with Them 
 
The existing logistical architectures, in the form of the Joint Logistics Functions 
and Classes of Supply, attempt to keep material flowing to the end user without any self-
imposed restrictions or constraints as well as anticipate and react to those imposed by an 
operational threat. A functioning logistical architecture must incorporate or represent the 
fundamental characteristics of effective and efficient CSS, which are: (Department of 
Army, 2003, p. 1-4) 
• Responsiveness – provide the right support to the right place at the right 
time 
• Simplicity – avoid unnecessary complexity 
• Flexibility – the ability to adapt existing structures and procedures to 
changing situations, missions and concepts of operations 
• Attainability – generating the minimum essential supplies and services 
necessary to begin operations 
 
FUNCTION DESCRIPTION 
Supply I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X 
Maintenance Consume VII, and IX in support of the warfighter 
Health 
Services 
Consume and manage VIII in support of the warfighter 
Transportation Move all Classes of Supply around the battlefield as well as consume 
copious amounts of II, III and IX 
Services Consume all Classes of supply in support of the warfighter 
General 
Engineering 
Consume and manage IV, VII, and IX in support of mobility and 
counter mobility 
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• Sustainability – the ability to maintain continuous support during all 
phases of campaigns and operations 
• Survivability – the ability to protect support functions from destruction or 
degradation 
• Economy – providing the most efficient support to accomplish the mission 
• Integration – synchronizing all aspect of CSS operations with joint 
operations in a seamless manner 
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
It is the ultimate goal of logistic planners at all levels to translate the art of 
logistics into CSS at the tactical level.  This is accomplished by tracking and reordering 
supplies in a timely manner and maintaining accountability and visibility of those 
supplies in the supply chain distribution system.  This ensures that the warfighter will 
have what they need when they need it. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“A Sea base is a system of systems enabling personnel, material, fires, and 
command and control to come together rapidly, integrate, and be projected as a flexible 
force capable of undertaking a broad spectrum of over-the-shore operations” (DSB, 2003) 
Logistics in a Sea Based environment is the cornerstone for success in future 
naval and expeditionary operations in the littorals of the world.  The indefinite 
sustainment of those naval and joint forces will be the key to success in providing 
military options against our future threats.  These military options will cause a future 
threat to think twice and provide a level of deterrence that enhances the options available 
to the National Command Authority when and if diplomacy fails.   
The sustainment of the Sea Base and all of the joint forces working in, through 
and around it will take the logistical coordination of many dynamic variables.  The 
logistical coordination will be required to be accomplished with an ever 
decreasing/constrained pool of available personnel.  The use of a system that senses and 
responds to the logistical needs of the warfighter will be necessary to accomplish the task 
of sustaining the sea base as well as conserve personnel strength while ensuring the 
accomplishment of any mission that is assigned to operational forces in a Sea Base.   
 
B. SEA BASING CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS  
“Sea basing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, 
reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing 
continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint force 
without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).  These 
capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry 
from the sea.” (DoD, 2005) 
 Sea basing augments joint force capabilities associated with using the sea as a 
maneuver and staging site.  It works in conjunction with Sea Shield and Sea Strike to 
provide a complementing capability that provides an advantage to our armed forces. (see  
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Figure 2)  It ensures joint forces will maintain access to the littoral regions of the world.  
It is comprised of several defining principles.  These principles are based on the 
advantages garnered from using the sea as a sovereign maneuver space that can be used 
with impunity and without the need of fixed ports or airfields. (DoD, 2005) 
• Use the sea as a maneuver space. 
• Protect joint force operations. 
• Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection. 
• Sustain joint force operations from the sea. 
• Leverage forward presence and join interdependence. 
• Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases. 
• Create uncertainty for our adversaries 
Sea basing assists in the executing of Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM), a 
supporting piece of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) the centerpiece of the 
United States Marine Corps’ vision for the 21st century. (Maritime Prepositioning Force 
2010 and Beyond, 1997)  It provides a stable, easily protected site to stage and execute 
operations in a Joint Operations Area (JOA). 
The maintenance, repair, medical treatment, and supply operations of the Joint 
Force will be conducted from sea based platforms.  Joint and naval distribution systems 
will replenish the logistical infrastructure afloat.  The ships or vessels that make up the 
sea base will reinforce the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) and sustain the surface 
combatants of the Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) and Carrier Strike Groups 
(CSGs).  In essence, the sea base will become floating warehouses for the forces 
deployed and operating afloat and ashore. (Kang & Gue, 1997) An Expert System that 
functions within the concept of Sense and Respond Logistics (S&RL) can be developed 





Figure 2. Integration of the Sea Base with Sea Shield and Sea Strike 
from (MCCDC, 2004) 
 
The Sea Base, located off the coast of an adversary, in a JOA, will employ the 
combat forces and equipment located onboard to engage a threat.  The combat forces in 
the Sea Base will be the one-two punch that keeps a threat guessing with the capabilities 
associated with Sea Strike.  Specific assets located in the Sea Base will provide force 
protection for the Sea Base and the combat forces ashore with the capabilities associated 
with Sea Shield.  
 
1. Close Phase 
“Rapid closure of joint force capability to an area in crisis.” (DoD, 2005) 
The assets that are closest to the JOA, such as a CSG or ESG, will displace from 
their original operating area or areas and sail to the area of interest designated by the 
National Command Authority (NCA).  The NCA consists of the President of the United 
States and the Secretary of Defense or their alternates who are the ultimate lawful source 
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of military orders. (National Command Authority, 2005)  The NCA’s representative in 
the geographical area is the Combat Commander (COCOM), who is responsible for all 
operations in an area or theater.  This allows the closing forces to take advantage of the 
sovereignty of the sea and provide an initial response that may provide a show of force 
that accomplishes the NCA’s will without actually engaging combat forces. (DSB, 2003)  
It also provides an initial force that can be used to secure limited objectives or conduct 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as Non-combatant Evacuation 
Operations (NEO), Nation Building exercises or emergency relief after natural disasters.  
A Joint Force Commander (JFC), appointed by the COCOM will provide the command 
and control required to make a concerted effort of the forces in the JOA. See Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Rapid Force Closure in the JOA 
 
2. Assemble Phase 
“Seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure sea 
based assets.” (DoD, 2005) 
Once the available forces in the area arrive at the JOA, additional forces start 
flowing into the area from CONUS and OCONUS.  These joint forces will assemble to 
create the operational and support assets required to execute the tasks assigned by the 
JFC. The reception and staging of the forces will commence in the Sea Base in 
anticipation of onward movement and integration into operations.  Assembling the joint 
21 
force in the JOA will be accomplished by air and sea with the use of inter-theater and 
intra-theater lift resources, such as the Air Force C-17s and C-130s as well as Navy High 
Speed Vessels (HSV) and Army Theater Support Vessels (TSV). See Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Assemble the Joint Forces projected  
from CONUS to the JOA at Sea from (MCCDC, 2004) 
 
3. Employ Phase 
“Flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives 
supported from the sea base.” (DoD, 2005) 
The joint forces assembled in the sea base will be employed to conduct OMFTS 
and STOM operations in the JOA.  These operations will be complimentary and use 
economy of force to meet the COCOM’s requirements and accomplish the overarching 
vision requested by the NCA for the JOA.  The joint force will employ sea, air and 
ground assets to shape the battlefield and make the opposing force submit to the JFC’s 
will with the optimum required force.  The joint force can also be used for MOOTW 
operations that will depend less on combat forces and more on Combat Support (CS) and 
Combat Service Support (CSS) forces which are in higher demand during nation building 




Figure 5. Employ the Joint Forces to accomplish a  
full spectrum of operations after (MCCDC, 2004) 
 
4. Sustain Phase 
“Persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore through 
transition to decisive combat operations ashore.” (DoD, 2005) 
The sustainment of the sea base will be accomplished by the CLF as well as Air 
Force strategic airlift and Navy strategic sealift.  Sustainment supplies will be shipped 
from CONUS and OCONUS sites to the JOA.  These sustainment supplies will be used 
to maintain the sea base as well as the forces ashore conducting STOM. 
The forces ashore will be sustained by air and over-the-shore by legacy and future 
multipurpose platforms such as the CH-53, CH-60, MV-22, LCAC, LCAC(X), LCU-
1600s and LCU-2000s.  These air and sea connectors will be required to carry supplies to 




Figure 6. Assemble Sustainment Forces in the Joint Operations Area 
from (MCCDC, 2004) 
 
Sustainment of a joint force without an advance base will be dependent on the 
ability of the joint force to project supplies into the JOA. (DSB, 2003) This sustainment 
of the sea base will be critical in determining the operations tempo and staying power of 
the joint force in the JOA.  The sea base will need dependable sea and air connectors to 
allow the joint force to stay on station for an indefinite time period.  If an opponent 
perceives a logistical shortfall they could wait out the joint force until it is no longer 
economical for it to remain in the JOA and thereby reducing the effectiveness of the sea 




Figure 7. Sustain Joint Forces ashore by Air and Sea after (MCCDC, 
2004) 
 
5. Reconstitute Phase 
“The capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat 
capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations” 
(DoD, 2005) 
The joint force must be able to extract itself from one location and reconstitute 
itself.  The sea base will reconstitute itself by repairing its equipment and replenishing its 
supplies as well as human resources.  The sea base will then have the ability to move to 
another location and set up a new JOA.  The joint forces in the sea base will then be 
utilized to accomplish follow-on missions.  The sea base must be able to transition from 
one style of operations to another in a very short time.  The threat force will have to keep 
guessing when and where the joint force will strike next.    The ability to make an 
opponent indecisive and the ability of the joint force to present multiple threats will 
create an additional facet to the NCA’s ability to use diplomacy and military threat to 
accomplish the desired effect without actually using the force.  A true diplomat, like a 
carpenter, must have a hammer and know how to use it. The sea base is a part of the 
hammer that will be used to shape and determine the outcome of diplomatic efforts in the 
future. See Figure 8. 
 




Figure 8. Reconstitution and Redeployment of Forces and  
Equipment for follow-on mission after (MCCDC, 2004) 
 
C. SENSE AND RESPONSE LOGISTICS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
“Sense and Respond Logistics is a transformational network-centric concept that 
enables Joint effects-based operations and provides precise, agile support.  Sense and 
Respond Logistics relies upon highly adaptive, self synchronizing, and dynamic physical 
and functional processes.”  (OFT, 2003) 
The DoD is developing a plan that incorporates S&RL into its existing logistical 
architectures. (Barnard, 2004)  S&RL is a “network-centric concept which enables Joint 
effects-based operations and provides precise, agile support.” (Office of Force 
Transformation [OFT], 2003)  It will provide a cross-service, cross-organizational 
logistical capability, linking many different entities together so that they can mutually 
support each other to accomplish their given tasks without creating any undue stress on 
the supply chain distribution system.  S&RL systems will support the requirements of the 
warfighter and assist them in receiving their specific supply needs in a timely and 
efficient manner that will compliment the existing supply chain distribution system 
S&RL is a concept in which the end user or “demand node” chooses a desired 
effect and the location of that effect which is called an “effect node”. (OFT, 2003)  The 
effect could be engaging a threat so that the threat is manipulated into making a decision 
that is desired by the JFC or it could be to repair equipment and maintain a desired level 
of supply in preparation for an operation.  The “point-of-effect” is the key to determine 
First Mission 
Follow-on  Mission 
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the capabilities necessary to accomplish the task as well as the time line required to make 
a request a reality.  Figure 9 depicts the concept of S&RL as it pertains to the entire 
spectrum of possible operations.  A robust command and control system will be required 
to capture the demands and process them throughout the system so that the right 
capabilities will be assigned to achieve the desired effect. 
 
 
Figure 9. End-to-End Sense and Response, from Point-of-Effect to 
Source of Support (OFT, 2003) 
 
The key concern and challenge associated with the S&RL concept are the areas 
between the demand nodes and effect nodes.  They are currently portrayed as a “logistics 
no-man’s land” where little is currently understood or determined. (OFT, 2003)  Linking 
the demand and effect nodes by a coherent method or methods will be required to make 
S&RL a fully functional concept. S&RL tackles several support issues such as: 
adaptability and speed; flexibility; modularity; integration. The use of an expert system in 
accomplishing S&RL will be invaluable in implementing the concept as well as making it 
a reality.  An expert system will not address all of the issues associated with the 
27 
distribution system required to deliver the effects based logistic but it will assist in 
determining the user needs and establishing distribution priorities associated with S&RL. 
 
1. Adaptability and Speed 
S&RL must adapt to ever changing logistics requirements.   Many of those 
requirements are unpredictable in nature.  (OFT, 2003)  They must be synchronized with 
the overall operations plan to ensure that resources are requested, obtained and delivered 
to the end user with the highest priority in a timely fashion.  S&RL must be coordinated 
with the concept of operations for a specific mission as well as the overall concept of 
logistics for daily operations.  The goal is to achieve the operational requirements of the 
JFC at the point-of-effect when it is most needed to create a positive effect for the end 
user and a negative effect for the threat at which the requirements are focused.  This 
focus on speed and adaptability will create a cumulative effect that allows the JFC to use 
economy of force as well as mass to create a desired outcome.  
 
2. Flexibility 
S&RL must be a flexible supply chain that can be modified to meet specific 
mission needs as well as the sustainment needs associated with keeping a force in the 
field or at sea. (OFT, 2003)  It must sacrifice some efficiency to accomplish this goal and 
can not be compared to an optimized supply chain similar to those visible at retail 
distribution supply chains in CONUS.  S&RL will require a constant negotiation of 
logistical priorities to ensure the right capability is provided for the right effect.  To 
remain flexible in nature, the supply chain distribution system should be independent 
from geographical constraints. (OFT, 2003)  In other words it should function in any 
environment and be effective in all possible JOA, including the sea base.  
 
3. Modularity 
S&RL must be modular in nature.  (OFT, 2003)  It will need to be able to provide 
logistical support to many different entities working in a JOA, i.e. Department of 
Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, etc.  The logistical 
support provided will be required to aid everyone and does not lend itself to the service 
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centric approach currently in use in the full gamut of operations possible.  The logistical 
support modules associated with S&RL will have full visibility of the logistical needs of 




S&RL must be integrated into all aspects of the joint environment.  It must be 
adaptive to ever changing requirements and responsive to the needs of the end user as 
well as the JFC.  There is little room for error or seams in the logistical system.  This will 
require an information technology/command and control system that can accommodate 
logistical visibility and provide a common access picture of the battle space, so that all 
elements of the joint force will be working in concert and not in tandem. (OFT, 2003)   
Nothing great can be accomplished without risk.  The risks associated with any logistical 
endeavor must be identified and mitigated to ensure a successful outcome. (OFT, 2003)  
The integration of S&RL into all levels of command and execution will be paramount. 
 
D. REVIEW EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS FOR COMMERCIAL LOGISTICS SYSTEMS 
Automated systems are currently being used in commercial applications by retail 
chains such as Seven-Eleven and Wal-Mart.  They have been successful in the 
implementation of the systems and have gained significant improvements in efficiency 
and reduced personnel costs.  These systems have assisted the chains in optimizing their 
respective supply chain and therefore solidifying their market position. 
 
1. Point of Sale Automatic Ordering 
Seven-Eleven has one of the most innovative inventory management systems of 
any retail chain.  The chain uses an Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) network which 
links the electronic ordering system with the Point of Sale (POS) system to track sales at 
each retail store and transmit the data to the head office, distribution centers, dedicated 
manufacturers and wholesalers and independent manufacturers and wholesalers.  
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The Electronic Point of Sale system was introduced between September 1982 and 
February 1983 in approximately 1,750 stores.  The data stored in the network could be 
accessed in the stores for local management.  By 1988, with the introduction of personal 
computers to the stores, the store manager could create graphs showing an analysis of 
sales by food category, actual sales time by slot and customer, daily totals, weekly 
averages, best to worst analysis of goods sold and even an analysis of discarded 
merchandise as a ratio to goods sold.   
These analyses were available at the regional office or head office in terms of the 
items purchased, time of purchase and information about the type of customer.  The 
customer information was captured on a separate keypad to indicate age within three age 
bands and whether the customer was male or female. 
The EPoS and online ordering system used the analysis data to allow the store 
managers to ensure that fast moving items were kept in stock, slow moving items were 
replaced, new merchandise was evaluated early and effectively, inventories were reduced 
and inventory turnover rates increased, and probably most importantly, the proper 
inventories were available on the shelf based on differing conditions at different times. 
Distribution to the stores created its own challenge.  In Japan, the Seven-eleven 
stores were able to place an order by 10:00am and be able to expect the delivery of the 
items by 3:00pm the same afternoon.  This level of delivery guarantee helped to reduce 
required inventories and helped to reduce the likelihood of sellouts of high volume items. 
(Sutherland, 1995) 
Another key to the success of Seven-Eleven is that each store caters to the local 
neighborhood.  For example, in San Francisco on Fisherman’s Warf, the store is filled 
with ready-to-go snack foods from sandwiches to pastries.  Not found in the store are the 
basic groceries associated with most stores in residential neighborhoods. (Sutherland, 
1995) 
 
2. Radio Frequency Identification in Supply Chain Management 
Wal-Mart is one of only a few major retailers who use a unique approach to 
inventory management.  This method is called Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI).  VMI 
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is a method of transferring the ownership of the inventory from the retailer to the 
supplier.  By doing this, the inventory as an asset comes off the balance sheet, and less 
working capital is needed to run the business.  VMI is enabled using information 
technology through the use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).  Each day, the 
suppliers pull down the inventory usage of each retailer, and identify the daily demand 
for their products.  They can then determine what the inventory levels should be based on 
current demand, and determine delivery requirements to the retailer.  Wal-Mart 
automated this process in the late 1980’s.  Prior to that, the vendor representatives would 
tour each retail store and perform manual inventories.  The use of VMI has resulted in the 
reduction of time between order and delivery of goods from as much as 25-30 days to 
around 14-17 days in some cases. (Emigh, 1999) 
The first use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in a retail store was by the 
European Retail Giant Metro.  The store, called “Future Store” was opened in Rheinberg, 
Germany in order to showcase the benefits of radio frequency identification technology 
to consumers, suppliers, and to Metro.  The goal was to use RFID to improve inventory 
control, supply chain execution, and product availability.   
RFID tags can be attached to nearly anything, including people, and tracked by 
proximity readers.  The idea was for Metro to ship and scan all products at their 
distribution center which would allow the Rheinberg store to track what was in the 
shipments, and when the shipments were scheduled to arrive, in real time.  Upon arrival, 
the Future Store could do an arrival scan to determine that all cases were received, and 
know within minutes without checking and rechecking individual pallets and doing a 
manual recount. (Barlas, 2003, April 28) 
Wal-Mart was not to be left behind in the RFID department.  They directed in 
June 2003 that their top 100 suppliers must use RFID by 1 January 2005.  The directive 
was to affix RFID tags down to the case and pallet level.  Each supplier is responsible for 
ensuring the tags are added to the cases and crates, and that the data associated with the 
tag is uploaded into the inventory system.  It was estimated that with this mandate, the 
demand for RFID tags would be around 8 billion per year just for the top 100 suppliers.  
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Wal-Mart is pushing the RFID revolution in the same fashion that they did with the 
implementation of scanning bar codes.  (Barlas, 2003, June 4) 
The use of the RFID technology will result in a great cost savings over inventory 
management, order control, inventory delivery time, and eventually will result in less 
time spent at the checkout counter. RFID will also reduce reorder and delivery times by 
providing a near-real-time view of what items are being sold and what items are in the 
supply chain replacing them.  This translates into a more efficient supply distribution 
chain with less inventory costs passed on to the customer. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The basing of large forces at sea and the use of automated systems to sustain them 
are important aspects of future operations in the littorals of the world.    Several 
commercial firms have made incremental steps toward achieving an optimized supply 
distribution chain but the observations have not been fully incorporated into a joint 
logistic architecture.  In many cases the commercial observations will not be completely 
implemented because of their optimized nature which will reduce the ability of the joint 
force to be flexible and adaptable when executing operations.  The reduction of 
manpower as well as the emphasis on economy of force and culminating effects based 
operations will require the assistance of automated and expert systems to accomplish the 
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IV. RESEARCH ANALYSIS OF LESSONS LEARNED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never 
be in peril.  When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your 
chances of winning or losing are equal.  If arrogant both of your enemy 
and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril. – Sun Tzu 
(Griffith, 1963) 
Those who do not learn from their mistakes are doomed to repeat them – 
Age Old Adage 
It's like deja-vu, all over again. – Yogi Berra (Berra, 1998) 
Through every conflict imaginable there have been lessons, lessons learned and 
lessons not learned.  It is incumbent upon a fighting force to learn from its mistakes.   
Mistakes made more than once are waste and totally unacceptable in a military operation.  
Surfacing challenges have to be managed in a timely manner, and their solutions have to 
be annotated, to ensure that follow-on forces do not waste valuable time by facing the 
challenge and “reinventing the wheel”.  A new solution to the same problem may not be 
as effective as the previous solution and could be much worse. 
Heuristic – “Involving or serving as an aid to learning, discovery, or problem-
solving by experimental and especially trial-and-error methods”  (Mish et al, 1996) 
Lessons learned are essentially heuristics that should be used to ensure that the 
same mistakes are not made again.  They should be simple and to the point. The simpler 
they are, the more they will be remembered, used and reused.  Heuristics are usually not 
optimal solutions, but they are sufficient enough to ensure that a quick and easy 
acceptable solution is achieved.  The following are some heuristic lessons learned 
concerning logistics and the ordering and reordering of supplies from modern conflicts in 
which the United States has been involved.    
 
B. WORLD WAR II LOGISTIC LESSONS LEARNED 
World War II challenged the United States logistically like no other war in 
history.  The US and its Allies fought three separate enemies on 5 different fronts:  
(Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North Africa/Southern Europe, China-Burma-India 
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and the Southern Pacific).  Supply operations during World War II were characterized by 
a push style of logistical planning and ordering.  Millions of tons of food, weapons and 
equipment were transported across the globe.  Supplies were gathered at ports of 
embarkation to await loading and transportation across the oceans to the war zones.  
Once the supplies reached their respective theater of operations, they were pushed 
forward to the units on the front lines.  Large supply dumps were created as far forward 
as possible so that they would be close to units that needed supplies, when the need was 
recognized. (Taylor, 1983)  This system worked, but it was very inefficient and incurred 
unnecessary wastage.  
Many new and unique practices were created or used during World War II.  They 
were the resulted from the optimization of various parts of an existing and inefficient 
supply system.  The US Armed Forces did the best they could with what they had.  
Ultimately, the Allies overwhelmed their foes by producing war material faster than the 
enemy could destroy it and replace their own losses. Logistical supply operations ensured 
a US and Allied victory over the Axis powers and some of the heuristics derived from the 
sub-optimized supply system are as valid today as they were during that conflict. The 
bottom line is that “large stockpiles of supplies on the battlefield are a thing of the past” 
(Bourgeois, 1999). 
 
• The packaging of supplies should be strong enough to contain the items 
but not bulky as to present problems in shipping and storage. (Note: 
Heuristic was derived from Leighton & Coakley, 1955) 
During Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, it was noted that packages 
of supplies should not be too large or heavy.  The packaging should be light and durable 
enough so that it can be manhandled and/or lifted by available cargo gear. (Leighton & 
Coakley, 1955)  In combat operations, logisticians try to increase throughput or supply 
chain velocity, so that the needed supplies are sent to forward units as quickly as 
possible.  That throughput is bottlenecked at the port of debarkation or anywhere along 
the supply chain, when cargo handling gear is not available to move it between modes of 
transportation.  If material handling equipment is not available, the lowest common 
denominator is raw manpower.  Supplies and their accompanying packaging should be 
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kept at a manageable, individual weight so that they can still be moved forward when 
material handling equipment is not available.  
• Soldiers should not be over equipped.  This adds hardship to the soldier 




Figure 10. Unloading barracks bags on Rendova Island (Bohrod, 1943) 
 
The combat soldier and Marine of World War II were grossly overloaded with 
personal equipment.  “This not only added to the burden the individual had to carry, but it 
taxed transportation and moreover, put unnecessarily heavy demands on the whole supply 
system.” (Huston, 1966)  It was noted during Operation Torch that the burden on 
individual soldiers crossing an assault beach should be reduced to a bare minimum.  
(Ross & Romanus, 1991)  Additional weight slows the overall advance of forces and 
fatigues those forces.  A lighter combat force has a higher probability of achieving its 
objective on or ahead of time. 
It was also noted in World War II that wear and tear on equipment was much 
higher for units that were in contact with the enemy and on the move.  Units that were 
directly engaged with opposition tended to lose or discard large amounts of individual 
equipment. (Ruppenthal Vol. II, 1959) Soldiers optimized their individual load so that 
they carried only what was most important to them into combat.  They kept what they 
absolutely needed and left the rest with a supply sergeant in the rear, or on the battlefield 
where it could be scrounged by a fellow soldier or by an enemy.  This abandonment of 
supplies was very wasteful and not an efficient manner of supply conservation. 
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• Pipeline and Supply usage factors are no more than reasonable 




Figure 11. Pipeline Construction, Linas, France (Dix, 1944) 
 
Planning factors and expenditure factors oversimplify the requirements of a 
theater of operation.  It is almost impossible to account for all of the variables associated 
with an operation before hand.  In 1943 the usage factors did not take into account such 
variables as climate, terrain, and intensity of action. (Leighton & Coakley, 1955)  An 
additional concern was that commanders and their logisticians overemphasized 
comparative data based on short periods of intense combat when expenditures where 
higher. (Leighton & Coakley, 1955) This over emphasis on combat derived data provided 
a much higher consumption rate for supplies during the periods of relative inactivity.   
The procurement of supplies to meet these real and perceived requirements was 
exacerbated by the theater’s absence of prompt planning for current and future 
operations. (Ruppenthal Vol. II, 1959)  This lack of appreciation did not take into account 
the transportation time required to transit the long distances between the Continental 
United States (CONUS) and the theater of operations.  It was noted that most field 
commands over-requisitioned supplies, over and above the standard usage factors.  This 
was an attempt to build up an unauthorized reserve in their area of operation.  It was 
perceived to be a cushion to take into account unpredictable delivery of supplies. 
(Ruppenthal Vol. II, 1959)  Those abusing units lacked supply discipline and did not have 
37 
faith in the existing supply chain to deliver what they needed, when they needed it.  A 
future supply ordering system must take into account the wants and needs of the end-user 
and not rely solely on predetermined factors that might or might not be realistic for the 
environment and scenario present in a JOA. 
 
C. KOREAN WAR LOGISTIC LESSONS LEARNED 
The Korean War occurred less than five years after the unconditional surrender of 
Japan and the conclusion of World War II. (Huston, 1966)   Logistical supply operations 
during the Korean War were based on the doctrine and experience developed during 
World War II.  Due to the unique conditions present on the Korean peninsula and limited 
aspect of war associated with the conflict, additional challenges and solutions were 
observed in reference to ordering and requisitioning supplies for combat and sustainment 
operations.   
Korea is over 5,000 miles from CONUS.  One of the biggest challenges 
associated with this war occurred in the transportation of supplies. (Huston, 1966)  Due to 
this huge distance, it took an average of 120 days from the order to the delivery of 
requested supplies, for a unit in combat. (Huston, 1966)  The twin tyrannies of time and 
distance created unique challenges and required careful logistical planning to ensure that 
the minimum amount of supplies would be present in theater to conduct operations.    
• Automatic supply is only as good as the data used to derive the supply 
requirement. (Note: Heuristic was derived from Huston, 1966) 
Automatic resupply shipments are predetermined packages of supplies based on a 
table of organization (type of unit) and generic consumption rates.  It is a PUSH type of 
system where supplies and material are shipped from CONUS to the theater so that 
supplies will be present, just-in-case. This provided additional stress to the overall 
transportation and storage requirements for the theater. (Huston, 1966)  It is inefficient in 
nature and incurs excessive wastage.  The data used to determine automatic resupply 
shipments are heuristic in nature and the actual amount of supplies delivered may not be 





noted that the planning, ordering and shipping time-lines were too elongated.  This was a 
liability, considering the ever shifting tactical and operational situations associated with 
the conflict. (Huston, 1966)   
• The hoarding of supplies hurts the entire force. (Note: Heuristic was 
derived from Westover, 1955) 
It was noted that some combat units hoarded supplies while other units 
desperately needed the same supplies.  The frivolous demands encountered by hoarding 
extra supplies took its toll on the entire system, by requiring a need for extra 
transportation assets while simultaneously decreasing the supply of vehicles because of 
increased operating distances.  (Westover, 1955)  The addition of superfluous items 
caused the overall force to lose mobility and decrease the efficiency of soldiers by 
overloading them. (Westover, 1955)  In several cases, Class II and IV items were 
abundant in Pusan but very rarely made it to the front lines.  This was due to fact that a 
greater effort was made to provide Class I, III and V items to combat units. (Westover, 
1955)  Many of the supplies at the forward units could have been redistributed to adjacent 
units that needed some of the items.  A lack of visibility in the forward units did not 
allow the operational logisticians to play the part of the honest broker.  
The goal of any supply system is to provide all classes of supply to the end-user 
and ensure that the combat commander has what he needs to provide a decisive effect at a 
decisive point in time.  It is a logistician’s job to ensure that the combat commander has 
the material needed to maintain combat strength.  The hoarding of supplies presents a 
distorted image that affects the overall ability of the force to sustain itself.  An expert 
logistical ordering system will prevent any one unit from hoarding supplies and ensure 
that supplies are redistributed to units as far forward in the battle space as possible. 
 
D. VIETNAM LOGISTIC LESSONS LEARNED 
The United States conducted operations in Vietnam for over ten years.  During 
this time, there was a logistic build up, a sustainment and a retrograde phase of 
operations.  Supplies were in such abundance that many items unknowingly fell into the 
hands of our antagonists. (Heiser, 1974)  This cannot be tolerated in the future, and 
supply discipline must be maintained.  The forces that are set ashore in a JOA should be 
provided with the equipment and supplies needed to accomplish the desired effect.   
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Excessive supplies are translated into wastage and will inevitably lead to a slower 
distribution system and therefore encourage the JOA’s forces to circumvent the supply 
system. 




Figure 12. Field Depot through Duc Storage Area, 5 Miles North of 
Saigon (Heiser, 1974) 
 
Large stockpiles should be kept to a minimum.  They make hard-to-defend, high 
value, targets for our enemies.  (Heiser, 1974)  Excessive concentration on troop standard 
of living (PX, i.e. Class VI) items will cause a corresponding effect on the supply chain 
distribution system.  This also affects the real estate associated with storing, delivering, 
maintaining and protecting those personal supplies.  (Heiser, 1974)  A set standard of 
Class VI requirements should be established at the beginning of an operation and adhered 
to by all operating forces.  If not, the consequences of degrading the distribution system 
will cause delays in the delivery of items necessary to create a true effects-based impact 
on the operation. A given standard-of-living could be programmed into an expert system 
that would sense the stature and longevity of the operation (based on size and timeline) 
and thereby determine the Class VI requirement.  The shipment of nonessential supplies 
from CONUS should be avoided. (Heiser, 1974) 
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• Separate supply systems cause confusion and should be avoided. (Note: 
Heuristic was derived from Heiser, 1974) 
Separate distribution systems for Medical, Signal, Aviation and Special Forces 
were functional in the circumstances associated with Vietnam, but they did not build 
upon each others strengths and weaknesses.  In future operations, more than one 
distribution pipeline will be severely uneconomical.  If the pipeline is too long and 
cumbersome, both in physical length and time, it will be susceptible to enemy attack and 
manipulation. (Heiser, 1974)  In future operations, a common supply-chain distribution 
system should be used to support all forces operating in the JOA.  This reduces 
redundancy and increases efficiency.  A common supply system would increase the 
visibility of duplicate supply requirements by adjacent units, thereby maximizing the 
efficient transport of these common needs.  An expert system will be able to track and 
assist in the management of the future distribution systems. 
 
E. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD /DESERT STORM LOGISTIC LESSONS 
LEARNED 
Saddam Hussein’s act of aggressively annexing the sovereign nation of Kuwait, in 
1990, elicited a counter response by the United States along with the support of the 
United Nations and coalition forces.  The US prepared to defend Saudi Arabia and retake 
the Emirate of Kuwait by first pumping in a deterring force and logistical support named 
Desert Shield.  The eventual transition from defensive to offensive operations was 
dubbed Desert Storm.  The most influential part of Desert Shield and Desert Storm was 
the logistical build up required to support and sustain the coalition forces in the deserts of 
Saudi Arabia. 
The forces participating in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm faced a difficult 
time adapting to the adverse and harsh atmosphere associated with desert warfare.  
Pushed to its limits, the equipment used during this campaign created an insatiable 
requirement for (Class IX) repair parts.  By developing an expert ordering system, 
America’s future fighting forces will be able to sense the environmental conditions in a 
given JOA and be prepared for the requests that emanate from it. 
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• Prepositioned stocks can be quite helpful in fulfilling early requirements, 
if you know what is available. (Note: Heuristic was derived from Pagonis 
& Cruikshank, 1992) 
 
 
Figure 13. SS GREEN HARBOUR of the Maritime Prepositioning 
Squadron 2 at Diego Garcia (The Motor Transport Corps, 2005) 
 
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) is a collection of ships strategically located 
around the world.  They are broken up into MPF Squadrons (MPSRON).  Before 
Operation Desert Shield, each squadron contained the equipment and basic supplies for a 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) sized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  
These MPF assets were the first cargo ships containing sustainment provisions to enter 
the ports of Saudi Arabia.  They were a primary source of material and supplies during 
the early phases of Desert Shield.  The bare minimum of every imaginable item needed 
was provided to sustain the early entry forces. (Pagonis & Cruikshank, 1992)  Without 
that initial infusion of supplies, the arriving combat forces would have had to survive on 
what they brought with them. The SS GREEN HARBOUR of the MPSFRON 2 was the 
first ship to arrive in Saudi Arabia carrying pre-stocked ammunition and equipment. 
(Figure 13) 
These prepositioned stocks were essential for the initial survival of the first 
responding units.  One of the main challenges observed was that no one meeting the MPF 
vessels knew what supplies were loaded in what container. (Vergun, 2002)  Each arriving 
container had to be opened and unstuffed to establish the contents inside.  An automated 
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expert ordering system will have visibility of all supplies on the MPF located in the sea 
base and will be able to cross level supplies to the end user needing them most. 
 
• Supplies that are over ordered and not consumed must be removed or 
destroyed so that the enemy will not have use of them. (Note: Heuristic 
was derived from Pagonis & Cruikshank, 1992) 
 
 
Figure 14. Equipment in Sterile Yard awaiting shipment to CONUS (The 
Motor Transport Corps, 2005) 
 
The surge personnel and supplies associated with Desert Shield as well as the 
significant planning associated with Desert Storm built up massive piles of supplies in 
and around the ports of Saudi Arabia.  The swiftness of the ground advance and the effect 
of the air war on the Iraqi Army were not anticipated and many of the supplies sent to 
theater were not needed. (Pagonis & Cruikshank, 1992)  The accumulation of excess 
supplies was due in part to poor or non-existent visibility of assets in theater and in the 
supply chain, which stretched half way around the world.  These excess supplies had to 
be repackaged and placed back on ships headed to CONUS or be destroyed so that the 
enemy would not have use of them.  This was an inefficient use of manpower and 
material that could have been prevented if properly managed.  In future JOAs, an 
overabundance of supplies may not be available.  An automated expert system will allow 
the logisticians in the sea base to maintain visibility and not reorder, or over order, 
supplies that are in the supply chain. 
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• “Automation can help offset the difficulty of providing logistics to 
supported units.” (Note: Heuristic was derived from Robinson & Walley, 
1994) 
During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, in-theater processing of containers 
presented a major challenge.  In many cases the documentation in the form of the ship’s 
manifest did not match what was in the containers.  (Pagonis & Cruikshank, 1992)  
Multiple consignee containers had to be unpacked at the port and repacked so that they 
could be transported to the correct unit in a specific area.  In some cases containers were 
sent forward, and 90% of the contents had to be returned to the correct receiving unit in 
the rear.  (Pagonis & Cruikshank, 1992)  A tremendous number of these containers with 
unidentified contents where delivered to theater.  This caused many containers to be 
frustrated (become non-deliverable without extensive research) at the port and not 
allowed to flow forward. (Pagonis & Cruikshank, 1992)  An automated form of cargo 
identification would have assisted logisticians in identifying the contents of containers 
and ensure that the right supplies went to the right place.  This would have dramatically 
increased throughput and assisted in providing a means to achieve requisition status 
information more rapidly.” (Robinson & Walley, 1994)  An automated expert ordering 
system will access a ship’s manifest and container data, giving visibility of the 
containers’ contents, for seamless visibility of the sea base and supply distribution chain.  
This will assist in the throughput of supplies forward to the units that need them ashore 
and at sea. 
 
F. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
In 2003, the United States and coalition forces massed in the Emirate of Kuwait, 
located on the Arabian Peninsula, in preparation for the invasion of Iraq.  The gathering 
of logistical support equipment and supplies went much smoother than that experienced 
during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  During OIF, logistical planners 
amassed “small hills” of supplies compared with the large mountains accumulated during 
the previous war. (Science Applications International Corporation [SAIC], 2003) Even 
still, these small hills are larger than what is envisioned to support future operations from 
a sea base.  Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is currently in its third phase and will not be 
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ending in the near future.  The following are several heuristics that have been derived in 
logistical operations observed during OIF1. 
 
• Success from anticipatory estimates is more from luck than by design. 
(Note: Heuristic was derived from SAIC, 2003) 
 
 
Figure 15. Convoy of tanker trucks carrying bulk Class III, preparing to 
cross the "berm" from Kuwait into Iraq (Courtesy of MAJ Lawrence Bittner, 
USAR) 
 
During the initial ground campaign of OIF1, CENTCOM logisticians tried to 
anticipate what the needs of combat maneuver units would be and queue the items in the 
supply chain for future use.  Pushing supplies forward before a need exists does not 
necessarily mean that combat troops will be getting what they need, when they need it. 
This system was primarily used to fill the gaps and limitations associated with inadequate 
logistical communication and information systems.  Essentially, the push system was 
blind. (SAIC, 2003)  The pushing of supplies through the Corps Support Area (CSA) may 
have also contributed to clogging the distribution system and providing combat units with 
excessive provisions. (SAIC, 2003)  It was noted by the 3rd Infantry Division that 
supplies coming from the CSA where not visible to its logisticians, and there was little or 
no idea of what was being pushed until it was received. (Third Infantry Division, 2003)  
Many additional items were reordered to replace items moving forward, once this initial 
surge of supplies left the staging areas of Kuwait with the leading maneuver units.  Over 
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3,000 containers of sustainment supplies, containing all classes of supply, were offloaded 
from cargo ships within weeks of the commencement of the ground offensive.  “The 
theater supply-and-distribution system became overwhelmed.” (Solis, 2004)   An expert 
ordering system, sensing the needs of the end user, will provide a consistent and steady 
flow of supplies from CONUS through a future sea base to operating forces, providing 
what it is needed when it is needed. 
 
• Effective communication equipment and supply architecture are necessary 
for all aspects of a fighting force and especially for logisticians. (Note: 
Heuristic was derived from Broadmeadow, 2003) 
 
 
Figure 16. A Container Management Team in Kuwait training with an 
Early Entry Deployment Support (EEDS) Kit (Courtesy of Henry Cook) 
 
The logisticians supporting OIF1 were handicapped, in some respects, by lack of 
a fully integrated and joint supply architecture that could support all components of the 
coalition forces in a timely and flawless manner.  This communication deficiency 
impeded the throughput and reliability of the request-pull system.  (SAIC, 2003) “The 
supply system architecture planned for use during OIF was a ‘workaround’ combination 
of systems and methods….that never permitted visibility at the battalion or division level 
of a requisition from inception to receipt.” (Broadmeadow, 2003)  The lack of a dedicated 
logistics communication architecture was noted in both the 3rd Infantry Division and 1st 
Marine Division After Action Reviews (AARs).  (Third Infantry Division, 2003) and 
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(Brief on 1 MARDIV Observations, 2003)   “The only consistently reliable form of 
communication was satellite communications (SATCOM) radios, but they were mostly 
distributed to combat units and not logistic units.” (SAIC, 2003)  Combat Service 
Support units should have had a dedicated system that allowed them the ability to track 
ordered items from the time they were initially requisitioned until the time of delivery to 
the end user.  
The effectiveness of an automated ordering system will revolve around the hub of 
a robust logistical communications system.  The system should be modular in nature and 
integrated into the communications architectures used in future conflicts.  A joint 
communication system needs to be fully developed and in place to ensure that all aspects 
of the behind the scenes logistics battle does not slow down or diminish the striking 
power of a future sea based combat force.  
• Prepositioned stocks are great but they do not have everything that is 
needed (Note: Heuristic was derived from Solis, 2004) 
The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), the Army Prepositioned Afloat (AFA) 
and the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) located in Kuwait were a key factor in the 
overwhelming success of ground combat associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
(Solis, 2004)  They allowed a rapid Reception, Staging, Onward movement and 
Integration (RSO&I) of Army and Marine Corps forces with their equipment.  This 
increased the combat power available to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in theater. 
One of the drawbacks to the availability of this prepositioned equipment existed 
in the fact that the deploying forces had very limited visibility of exactly what were in 
those stocks.  The personnel affiliated with each source of supply knew what they had, 
but the maneuver unit staffs did not know exactly what was available unless they made 
liaison with that entity. (Solis, 2004)  The logisticians associated with maneuver units 
ordered and reordered supplies, when in fact those supplies were already available in 
theater.  This lack of prepositioned stock visibility “worsened an overwhelmed theater 
supply and distribution system.” (Solis, 2004)  The initial lack of visibility, compounded 
by the determination of the combat logistician supporting the first responding maneuver 
forces, caused the supply chain to lose velocity.  The supply distribution system will be 
more efficient if the supplies located in theater are cross-leveled as far forward as 
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possible and used more wisely.  Future logistical systems that operate in a sea based 
environment will have full visibility of prepositioned stocks so that they will be used 
first.  Those supply items not available in the sea base will be shipped from CONUS once 
requested. 
• Knowing where your supplies are located is half the battle.  Getting them 
to the right place at the right time is the other half. (Note: Heuristic was 
derived from SAIC, 2003)  
 
 
Figure 17. RFID Tag used during OIF3 to track containerized cargo 
(Courtesy of Henry Cook) 
 
The logisticians participating in OIF, as well as Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF), used various aspects of commercial enterprise to keep track of the items ordered 
and evolving through the supply distribution chain.  They maintained In Transit Visibility 
(ITV) with the use of Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID) in conjunction with a 
number of web based applications to monitor the progress of orders.  Over 70% of the 
material entering theater could be identified and located rapidly during OIF1, which was 
an improvement over Desert Storm. SAIC, 2003)  The ITV of the supplies was 
exceptional from CONUS to theater but much of the visibility was lost once the shipping 
containers or air cargo pallets left their respective Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) or 
Airport of Debarkation (APOD).  (SAIC, 2003)  This was due in part to the lack “of 
consistently dependable communications systems”. (Third Infantry Division, 2003)  This 
gap in ITV prohibited the logistical systems in use from facilitating the onward  
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movement of material from SPOD or APOD to the order’s initiator. (SAIC, 2003) The 
dramatic decline of ITV in theater may in part be due “to the emphasis on pushing 
material forward.” (SAIC, 2003) 
ITV of supplies in Kuwait and Iraq may be related to the RFID tags themselves.  
The batteries in many of these tags fail prematurely, due to the excessive desert heat.  The 
tags are also sometimes removed, accidentally or on purpose, during the transportation 
process.  The human factor associated with ITV is excessive.  An additional concern is 
the lack of an interface with the ITV system by the end user.  “The work-around 
combination of systems never permitted visibility at the battalion level of a requisition 
from inception to receipt.” (Brief on 1 MARDIV observations, 2003)  The lack of an 
integrated systems architecture resulted in a less than optimal solution with respect to 
ITV.  Consequently, this resulted in very little assurance that the right supplies terminated 
in the hands of the right people, at the right time, and in the right place.   
An automated and integrated expert ordering system will provide the end user 
with a clear and concise status of the supplies ordered.  An estimated arrival date will be 
provided to prevent the reorder of supplies.  This will assist in alleviating the negative 
consequences associated with over ordering supplies, in a human effort to hedge bets and 
over acquire scarce resources.  The ability of the end user to see exactly where supplies 
are in relation to the unit’s location will add a bit of surety to what has been called the 
management of organized chaos. 
 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Many different heuristics have been noted throughout past wars in reference to 
what can be done differently or improved in the way of logistics on the battlefield.  Many 
of them have been common sense in nature and others have been hard learned over and 
over again. In addition to the heuristics noted above, future logistic architectures and 
systems should address the following items: 
• Limit the length and links associated with the supply chain distribution 
system  
• Cross level supplies as far forward as possible 
• Improve logistics communication which will maintain and improve ITV 
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• Beware of inefficient push type logistic systems; do not create logistical 
mountains or hills 
• Do not overload combat troops with more than what is absolutely 
necessary, keep them as light and maneuverable as possible 
These heuristics assist in defining the requirements of future logistical 
architectures by ensuring that the obvious is not forgotten or confused in the clutter 
associated with the modern day acquisition process.  
Military logistical concepts of operation have improved over time, but some of 
the lessons learned are appropriate in today’s conflicts as well as future JOAs.  Lessons 
learned must be incorporated into any future logistical system as a heuristic manner of 
coping with past imperfections.  The proposed architecture for an expert ordering system 
will not be perfect, but it will incorporate some of the heuristics that have evolved over 
the last 60 years of joint and semi-joint warfare.  The architecture will be a building block 
that can be used in future generations of automated logistics systems. The efficiency and 
robustness of future logistical architectures will determine the ultimate staying power of a 
combat force and will determine the outcome of future conflicts.  The armed forces of the 
United States must learn from past experiences and ensure that our enemies do not 
exploit our lessons not learned. 
Today’s military forces are very mobile.  The large stockpiles of logistical 
supplies, present in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom will be too burdensome to support.  This will make logistics the linchpin to 
success in any future operation.  Future logistical systems must maximize the use of 
automated distribution and tracking systems that allow for the continuous visibility of 
supplies from their points of origin to their final destinations.  (Bourgeois, 1999)  The 
automation must be developed into an architecture that can accommodate any envisioned 
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V. EXPERT ORDERING SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
A. ARCHITECTURE FRAMEWORK 
“Architecture is the art and science of designing and building systems.” 
(Webster’s II, 1984)  A systems architecture is the framework used to tie all of the 
subsystems together and accomplish the ultimate requirements of that system. This helps 
the designer to break the system into smaller systems, which can be decomposed to the 
solution level and optimized.  These solutions can then be tested, and re-integrated into a 
complex system which answers the initial complex problem.  The Systems Architecture 
is the roadmap for this process.   
The most common form the architectural decomposition takes is the Functional 
Decomposition.  In a Functional Decomposition, the System is broken down into its parts 
by function.  The problem is then decomposed until a solution is derived for that part.  In 
this case, the problem of ordering supplies is the start point, and decomposing from that 
point forward.   
There are six major functions required to perform the process of Ordering 
Supplies.  They are Identify Need, Acquire Supplies, Package, Transport, Store, and 
Track Status. These divisions are created based on who is responsible for each function. 
Five of them have to do with the ordering process, and the sixth is for tracking the 
supplies while in transit.  The Expert System discussed here would be used to address the 
problems associated with the major functions of identifying the need, acquiring the 
supplies, and tracking the status.  The packaging, transporting and storing of the supplies 
are beyond the scope of this thesis.  Figure 18 shows the Functional breakdown on the 
ordering system analyzed. 
The Identify Need function is primarily performed by the logistician in the JOA.  
The logistician is responsible for ensuring the order is entered into the system to include 
all critical data. He or she is responsible for identifying the class of the item, the item 
description and National Stock Number (NSN), the Quantity required for this order, and 
identifying the priority of the order. The logistician must assemble these components and 
enter them into the ordering system.  
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The second function, Acquire Supplies, is assisted by the Expert Ordering system. 
In this functional segment, the Expert Ordering system checks the inventories of the local 
supply, any adjacent supply availabilities, and the sea base.  If the item is still not located 
in sufficient quantities, the system continues to check the CONUS depots before placing 
an order with the manufacturer.  When the system locates the required item, it will 
determine the best location to draw from based on priority, availability, delivery time, 
and cost of transportation.  It then would flag the item(s) for transport.  The system is 
then responsible for reordering supplies to back fill the item(s) from where it was (they 
were) taken.  It does this by preparing the order for the manufacturer and submitting the 
order for approval. 
The third function is the Track Status.  This is the section which makes the Expert 
System unique.   The track status division contains the updated supply data, the status of 
the track history, and provides trend data.  This trend data is used by the Expert Ordering 
system to adjust required supply levels based on typical usage data.  It will be capable of 
increasing and decreasing these supply levels based on usage rates, mission requirements, 





Figure 18. Functional Decomposition of an Ordering Ssytem 
 
B. ARCHITECTURE VIEWS 
1. Operational View 
“The operational view shows how military operations are carried out through the 
exchange of information.  It is defined as a description of tasks and activities, operation 
elements, and information flows integrated to accomplish support military operations” 
(Maier & Rechtin, 2002, p. 224).  Three of these elements are required for most systems 
engineering projects. They are the Operational View (OV) 1, the OV-2, and the OV-3. 
“High-Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1): A relatively unstructured 
graphical description of all aspects of the systems operation, including organizations, 
missions, geographic configuration, and connectivity.  The rules for composing this are 













Figure 19. Expert System OV-1 In-theater with reach-back to CONUS 
 
Figure 19 provides a graphic depiction of the high level conceptual view of the 
Order and Reorder system, showing the communication from the Sea Base and forces 
ashore conducting operations to CONUS through a satellite communications system.  The 
system is fully integrated into the Sea Base.  The System first searches adjacent units 
ashore for the required supply items, then at the Sea Base, then at the Depot, then at the 
Manufacturer (Noted by Green Lines).  The Expert System locates the available supply 
item or items, and determines the best source of that item based on availability and 
priority.  The system then requisitions the item from that source, and places a back order 












Figure 20. Expert System OV-1 from the satellite to the supply system in 
CONUS 
 
The OV-1 diagram continues in Figure 20 by showing the communication from 
the Satellite communications system to the System Server in CONUS.  Should the expert 
system not locate the required supply item from the in-theater sources, it reaches back to 
CONUS supply depots. If the item is still not located, the item is requested directly from 
the manufacturer.  The system notifies the logistician of the expected delivery of the item.  
The expert system also prepares requisitions to re-supply expended items from units and 
the sea base.  Based on demand and other environmental factors, the expert system may 
increase or decrease the item count in the unit Authorized Stockage List (ASL) for that 
item and orders more or fewer of that item than is required to replace the used stock. 
“Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2): Defines the operational 
nodes, and activities at each node, and the information flows between nodes.  The rules 
for composing this are more structured than for OV-1, but still loose” (Maier & Rechtin, 
2002). 
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The Expert System OV-2 is shown in Figure 21.  This diagram shows the major 
actors and systems used in the order and reorder of supplies.  It takes into account the 
actual flow of supplies from node to node.  The information that passes between the 
nodes is as follows: 
A) The End User identifies a need and sends the request for supplies to the 
Logistician.  The Logistician replies to the End User stating that they received 
the order and provide a status of when the order was placed. 
B) The Logistician validates the inputs and sends the request to the Expert 
System and the Expert System responds with a notice that it received the 
request. 
C) The Expert System checks each of the potential Sources of Supply in an 
expanding search starting with the closest in-theater units. 
D) The Expert System searches the Sea-base for the needed supply.  If the Sea-
base has the supply item, it is sent to the distribution system along path “G” 
and a status is sent back to the Expert System along path “H”.  If the required 
item is found in multiple locations, the Expert System makes a determination 
of where to pull the item from based on availability and priority. 
E) If the supply is not located in-theater, the Expert System searches the CONUS 
Depots for the needed supply.  If the Depot has the supply item, it is sent to 
the distribution system along path “G” and a status is sent back to the Expert 
System along path “H”. 
F) If the supply item is not located at the Depot, the Expert System prepares a 
requisition and submits it to the Manufacturer.  
G) At whichever point the supplies are located, the supplies are sent to the 
distribution system. 
H) The Distribution System sends the status of the order to the Expert System for 
tracking purposes. 
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I) The Distribution System sends the supplies to the Logistician and back fills 
the used supplies to the Depot, Sea base, and other in-theater units as 
required.. 
J) The Logistician forwards the supplies to the End User, completing the Order 
loop. 
Not shown in Figure 21, is the track and status and the decision-making loop for 
adjusting the ASL levels at the sea base and at the operational units.  The Track and 




Figure 21. Expert System OV-2 Diagram 
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The third operational view that is typically created is the Operational Information 
Exchange Matrix.  The Operational Information Exchange Matrix (OV-3) is a matrix 
description of the information flows among nodes.  This is normally done as an 
augmented form of data dictionary table. (Maier & Rechtin, 2002)  The OV-3 diagram 
depicts logical interfaces between the nodes.  These logical interfaces are also shown in 
sequence diagrams. Sequence diagrams show the data transfer through a standard 
verb/noun relationship. For example, the data passing between the end user and the 
Logistician could be stated as provide order data. The term “order data” is a specific set 
of information.  The actual information items making up “order data” would be detailed 
out in the system dictionary. The OV-3 is not provided as the definition of the data items 
included in these logical interfaces requires a greater detail than what exists in this high 
level architecture. 
The remaining operational diagrams are used only as needed to add clarity or 
assist in the design.  They are not shown because the information contained requires more 
detail than is available at this level of decomposition. The Organizational Relationships 
Model (OV-4) is a moderately structured model of command relationships. (DoD 
Architecture Framework Working Group [DODAF], 2004)    It shows the role or 
organizational relationship between the organizations.  The Activity Model (OV-5) is 
very similar to a data flow diagram for operational activities. (Maier & Rechtin, 2002)  
Activity diagrams depicting the order and reorder activity are shown later.  Activity 
diagrams used in the Order and Reorder process are depicted in Figure 24 to Figure 30.  
The Operational Rules Model (OV-6a) identifies the business rules that constrain the 
system operation. (DODAF, 2004)  The Expert System would use these business rules to 
analyze the input data.  The Operational State Transition Description (OV-6b) defines the 
business process responses to events. (DODAF, 2004)   This is usually a formal diagram.  
As decomposition continues, the Operational Event-Trace Description (OV-6c) diagrams 
are developed.  These are trace activities in a scenario or Use Case in a sequence-of-
events-format. (DODAF, 2004)  These diagrams are typically developed from the OV-5 




is the Logical Data Model (OV-7).  This is usually a class-object model or some other 
type of relational data model.  It defines the data requirements and relationships. (Maier 
& Rechtin, 2002) 
 
2. System View 
“The System View is defined as a description, including graphics, of a system and 
interconnections providing for, and supporting, warfighting functions.  The system view  
is described with one essential product and twelve optional products.” (Maier & Rechtin, 
2002, p. 225)  The one required element is the System Interface Description, also known 
as the System View (SV) 1, 
The System Interface Description model identifies the system’s physical nodes 
and their interconnections. (Maier & Rechtin, 2002, p. 225)   It is similar to the 
operational node connectivity description (OV-2), but without the human interface.  The 
SV-1 for this Expert System will show the communication between the expert system, 
and the inventory data stored at each unit, sea base, and depot. 
The Expert System SV-1 is shown in Figure 22.  
• Connection A:  The diagram shows the interaction between the expert 
system and other in-theater units as well as the sea base inventory as it 
searches each potential source for the needed item. 
• Connection B:  This shows the communication between the expert system 
and the Depot level inventory data.   
• Connection C:  The expert system interacts with the manufacturer when 
the needed supply item is not located as well as to back fill cross-leveled 
or forwarded supplies.   
• Connection D:  This shows the interconnection between the expert system 
and the distribution system for tracking purposes. This feedback is then 




Figure 22. Expert System SV-1 Diagram 
 
3. Technical View 
“The technical view is defined as a minimal set of rules governing the 
arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of system parts or elements, whose 
purpose is to ensure that a conformant system satisfies a specified set of requirements.  It 
has two elements, one required and one optional or supporting” (Maier & Rechtin, 2002, 
p. 226). The required element is the Technical Architecture Profile View (TV-1).  The 
Technical Architecture Profile is a listing of the standards mandatory for the system 
being described.  In most applications of the C4ISR Architecture Framework (CAF) the 
technical architecture comes from the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA). (Maier & 
Rechtin, 2002)  The supporting element is the Standards Technology Forecast or TV-2 
diagram.  This is a projection of what standards and products will emerge during the time 
the system is developed and operated. (Maier & Rechtin, 2002) 
These are the architectural views that are normally used in a complete 
decomposition. This thesis will not decompose below a high level description and TVs 
61 
will not be presented. The specific requirements associated with completing the TVs are 
complex and will require enormous input from all of the present and future stakeholders 
which are not currently defined or known. 
 
C. USE CASES 
“A Use Case represents a series of interactions between an outside entity and the 
system, which ends by providing business value.” (Kulak & Guiney, 2004, p. 35) 
Use Cases are a verbal and pictorial method of expressing how a specific process 
functions.  It includes a description of the process, who the actors are in the process, what 
the triggers are in the process, what preconditions existed before the process began, a 
basic course of events, any exceptions to the basic flow, what the post conditions will be, 
any business rules associated with the process, and any technical requirements for the 
process to function properly.  Actors are users, other systems, or external events that 
interact in a process. (Kulak & Guiney, 2004) 
Here, the Use Cases are used to examine what aspects of the legacy ordering 
system need to be addressed, what areas can be automated, and how they might be able to 
be automated.  The Use Cases are used to validate the functionality of the architecture. 
 
Ordering Supplies Use Case 
The first process examined is the process of ordering supplies.  This process 
follows the steps required from the identification of the need, through developing the 
requisition, to submitting the requisition, through the search for the needed items, and 
finally ends with the item received by the end user. 
The primary actors in this process are the supply system, the logistician or 
requestor, and the end user.  In the improved ordering system, the expert system would 
replace the ordering system actor. 
The trigger for this process is that a need is identified, and the end user reports to 
the logistician to request the item. 
The basic course of events is as follows: 
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1. Identify the item and class of supply needed 
a.  Identify the item and class of supply needed 
b. Identify the quantity of the item required 
c. Check local inventories for the item 
d. If the item is in inventory, issue the item to the end user and place an 
order for the used inventory item 
e. Assemble the order for the needed supplies 
f. Identify the priority for the supplies 
2. Acquire the needed supply item(s). 
a. The order is received by the sea base. 
b. The logistician in the sea base checks onboard inventories for the 
needed supplies. 
c. If the item is onboard, the logistician issues the item to be sent ashore 
for the requesting unit with the method determined by the priority of 
the item. 
d. If the item is not aboard, or if the item has been issues from inventory, 
the logistician prepares an order to reach back to the CONUS depots. 
e. The order is received by the depot logistician who checks on-hand 
inventories and issues the item, or back orders the needed items from 
the manufacturers as required. 
3. Package and transport the supply item(s). 
a. The needed item(s) are packaged and assembled based on the intended 
destination (i.e. depot, sea base, in-theater units). Ideally, the packages 
should be prepared so that there is no need to open and repackage the 
items before the end user receives the order.  This improves the 
throughput efficiency. 
b. Assemble the shipments and determine the best method of transport. 
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c. Transport the supply items as far down the distribution chain as 
possible 
d. Break the shipments into orders and distribute them to the logistician 
4. Store and distribute the supply item(s) to the end user. 
a. The logistician receives the supplies and checks what is received 
against the unit’s orders 
b. The logistician determines whether the items are needed immediately 
or are to replace used stock 
c. The logistician distributes the supplies as needed and stores the restock 
items 
This flow shows how the system would function without the expert system in 
place of the supply system.  In the first step of identifying the needed supply item(s), the 
expert system would replace the need for the logistician to check the local inventory.  If 
the item is in the inventory, it would notify the logistician and the logistician could issue 
the item(s) to the end user.  The expert system would then re-order the expended 
inventory item. If the item is not in stock, the expert system would assemble an order and 
seek the supplies at adjacent units, and at the sea base.  The expert system has the ability 
to search nearby inventories as well as the sea base inventory. There is no need for 
additional personnel until the item is located or has to be ordered from the manufacturer. 
The expert system would have the ability to check all in-theater inventories in the 
time that the local logistician is able to check just the unit’s local stock.  This accelerates 
the locating of the item, and shortens the Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT).  MLDT is 
the total time between the identifying of a needed item to the time the needed item is in 
the end user’s possession.  Additionally, the expert system has the ability to increase 
accuracy of the item by first ensuring all required information is entered by the logistician 
before the order is submitted, and then by reducing the number of human hands involved 
in the inventory search. 
The expert system can assist the logistician in the store and distribute process by 
immediately identifying the purpose of the supplies received. The expert system can also 
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provide a level of visibility to the logistician.  When the needed supply item(s) is found, 
the expert system can estimate the transit time, and notify the logistician of 
approximately when the unit can expect the supply item(s).The logistician can also 
initiate an order status request. The expert system will query the distribution system to 
determine where the supply was last and give an estimated time of arrival.  For this part 
of the system to function properly, there would need to be advances in the fidelity of in-
transit visibility (ITV) presently available in the distribution system.   
The final key to the expert system is the ability to improve the local supply stock 
levels.  The expert system will take trend data to determine usage rates.  This usage rate 
will take into account environmental factors such as temperature and location (desert 
versus jungle), mission (peacekeeping versus assault), and many other factors as yet to be 
determined.  The expert system will then recommend changes to the ASL based on these 
analyses. 
 
D. USE CASE DIAGRAMS AND ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS 
Use Case diagrams and activity diagrams are an effective way to graphically 
represent the Use Case.  A Use Case diagram shows the high level process and what the 
activities are that support that process, and what actors interact with the process. (Kulak 
& Guiney, 2004)  Both Use Case diagrams and activity diagrams make up the OV-5 
views.  
Figure 23 shows the over-arching Use Case of ordering and re-ordering supplies.  
The Order and Reorder activity is the highest level being considered in the asset 
management world.  In this diagram, it is clear who is involved in the overall process, 
from the actor involved in ordering the supplies, to the actors involved in moving the 
supplies, to the actors involved in receiving the supplies.  The expert system would be the 




Figure 23. Expert System Order and Reorder Supplies Use Case 
 
Each major step in the ordering process is in itself a process (or activity).  These 
activities are shown on the diagram as separate Use Cases as per the Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) coding. (Kulak & Guiney, 2004)  In UML, an oval represents a Use 
Case.  The bubbles located inside the larger bubble indicate that these Use Cases are an 
extension of the higher-level Use Case.  The actors have a Generalization relationship 
with the Order and Reorder Supplies activity, since they play a part and interact at 
different points during the activity.  The steps required to perform the Order and Reorder 
Supplies process are Identify Needed Supplies, Acquire Needed Supplies, Package and 
Transport, and Store and Distribute.  See Figure 24. 
The Track and Status Use Case is also a part of the Order and Reorder Use Case..  
The Order and Reorder Use Case does not require the Track and Status use case, however 




Figure 24. Order and Reorder Supplies Activity Diagram 
 
Each of next level Use Cases is its own separate process.  Each process can be 
broken into the steps required to perform that process.  These steps are shown on an 
Activity Diagram.  Activity diagrams focus on the changes from one state to another. 
(Kulak & Guiney, 2004)  Figure 24 shows the steps contained in the System level activity 
of Order and Reorder Supplies.  The activities in this diagram correspond to the use cases 




Figure 25. Identify Needed Supplies Activity Diagram 
 
Each of these activities can be broken down at the next level into the steps 
required to perform the activity.  The steps required to identify needed supply are detailed 
in Figure 25.  The steps required to acquire needed supplies are detailed in Figure 26.  
Figure 27 depicts the steps in packaging and transporting the supplies, and Figure 28 
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indicates the steps to store and distribute the supplies to the end user.  The distribution 
network falls outside the scope of this paper and will only be discussed as necessary to 
support the expert system discussion.  It does not specify a mode such as road, rail, air or 
sea.   
Figure 29 is one of the key reasons for the expert system.  By using an interface 
defined between the Logistician and the expert system, the Logistician can find out where 
in the supply chain their required supplies are located.  The system envisioned here is 
similar to that used by United Parcel Service (UPS).  The method for transporting the 
supplies to the Logistician will be based on the priority given to the order at the time of 
the order.  Tracking and statusing will also recommend the modifications to the 
approving authority for a unit’s ASL.  The unit’s ASL should be modified and tracked for 
the environmental and operations expected.  This will provide valuable data and 
information for future units conducting similar missions in similar environments. They 
will be better prepared.   
The tracking and reporting that provides the visibility of the supply chain can be 
accomplished by many different methods, such as active or passive RFID or Global 
Positioning System (GPS) tracking.  The implementer of the expert system must 
determine what legacy or future systems to incorporate into the tracking module. 
The final activity diagram shown here is the primary key to the expert system.  
This diagram (Figure 30) shows the process where the expert system analyzes the 
ordering of each unit and updates the unit’s recommended stockage lists with an 
optimized set of stores.  The expert system can use a set of known business rules to 
examine the usage by that unit, and either increase or decrease a specific item as 
necessary to minimize the weight and volume of stores transported by the unit, and at the 
same time ensuring the highest level of availability of the unit. 
The expert system will combine a number of factors including environmental, 
usage, and mission factors.  The environmental factors include inputs for weather such as 
hot, cold, dry, or rainy.  The system would allow for climate inputs such as artic, 
temperate, tropical, or arid.  The system should also analyze terrain data such as flat, 
mountain, hills, woods, swamp, jungle, and of course urban. 
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The usage factors would be based on trend data stored within the expert system.  
If the expert system determines there is an increased need for a particular supply item, the 
system will increase the recommended stockage list to compensate.  The actual changes 
to the stockage list should still be approved by the unit’s Logistician.  If he or she 
approves the changes, the expert ordering system can assemble and submit a requisition 
for supplies to update the existing supplies to meet the minimums in the updated 
recommended stockage list. 
The unit mission will affect the recommended stockage list as the various 
missions have differing requirements.  For example, MOOTW would likely require less 
ammunition supply than an assault force would require.  The type of ammunition would 
be different as well. 
The expert system could go another step forward by analyzing the stockage lists 
at the sea basing level and even at depot level.  The expert system can analyze the trend 
data for previous missions of like type, and recommend changes to the sea base or to the 
depot levels based on this trend analysis data.  This can be used to optimize inventory 
stockage at all levels of supply. 
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Figure 30. Recommend Update of ASL Activity Diagram 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The architectural views provide a top level solution for ordering and reordering 
supplies in a sea based environment.  The Use Cases validate the architecture and provide 
insight that can be used to write and construct business rules that will assist in the 
implementation and optimization of the expert ordering system. 
These Use Case diagrams can be decomposed to lower levels which provide a 
greater level of fidelity to produce code in future iterations.  In each of these Use Case 
diagrams, the activity occurs in a specific column, or swimlane.  The swimlane is used to 
help identify who performs the activity or step in that column. 
The distribution system is solely used as the glue which ties the nodes together in 
the supply chain.  No existing or legacy systems have been mentioned at this time.  Some 
of the systems may fully meet the modular needs of the architecture, but the architectural 
views and Use Cases concentrate on the high level needs of the system.  It will be the 
decision of the implementing agency to pick or create the systems that plug into the 




















This thesis has addressed the concerns associated with the ordering and reordering 
process for forces operating in a sea based environment as well as other contingencies.  
Over the years, the Armed Services have improved their efficiency in delivering supplies 
to forward forces.  The idea of an expert system to reduce the manpower associated with 
the logistics system is simply the next logical step in streamlining the logistics process. 
 
B. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of benefits have become apparent in the development of this thesis.  At 
present, the order and reorder system is somewhat labor-intensive.  An expert system will 
reduce manpower by eliminating the need for separate Logisticians to check inventories 
for the same item.  In place of the additional Logisticians, the expert system will check 
adjacent units and the sea base for the needed supply.  Should the item not be located 
with adjacent units, sea base or depots, the expert system will assemble an order and 
submit the order directly to the manufacturer.  In this way, an expert ordering system will 
simplify the ordering and reordering of all classes of supplies by only requiring the 
Logistician to enter the needed supply data a single time.  Then, as items are used from 
the on-hand stocks, the expert system will place the orders necessary to maintain the 
ASL.  The Logistician is presently required to keep up with each item ordered, to ensure 
that any used stockage is replaced in a timely manner.  The expert system will do this for 
the Logistician automatically.   
The expert order system is expected to provide several improvements in the 
efficiency of the ordering system.  Since the data is entered by a single Logistician, there 
is less opportunity for error to enter the system, resulting in increased accuracy and 
velocity.  Since the expert system is doing the inventory assessment and order packaging 
planning, it will result in an increase in efficiency and throughput. 
An important advantage to the expert system will be the ITV of the supplies.  The 
end users will be able to get an estimate of when the needed items will arrive, and so will 
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be less likely to over-order.  This increases end user’s surety or trust in the system and 
will likely result in a decrease in hording.  This has an added effect of reducing the 
quantity of supplies required to be transported, thereby reducing the possibilities of 
slowing the throughput of the overall distribution system. 
Finally, the expert system will provide statistical tracking for ASL adjustments.  
These statistical adjustments will be reviewed against the vital environmental and 
mission data and recommend updates to the ASL.  Providing these updates would require 
much time and energy from the Logistician, as well as a level of visibility that may not be 
available to the unit logistician.  The end result is that the expert system will analyze this 
data and will recommend changes to right-size the ASL at the unit level, the sea base 
level, and potentially even at the depot level.   
 
C. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis presents a high level look at the concept of using an expert system to 
improve the efficiency of Logisticians supporting units conducting a full spectrum of 
operations.  By incorporating an expert system to make adjustments to the unit and depot 
level ASL, the logistician is given the opportunity to focus more on providing exceptional 
service to the end user.  The architecture presented in this thesis can be used as a basis to 
continue decomposition in accordance with the DODAF standards, to the code level to 
create a functioning prototype of the expert system. This prototype can then be tested and 
implemented into the order and reorder process.  
An additional area of future study would be to conduct a stakeholder analysis for 
the Joint logistical system as a whole with a focus on addressing the needs concerns and 
challenges associated with incorporating an expert ordering system.  The stakeholder 
analysis would identify any individuals or organizations having an interest or interface 
with the expert system.  This document would help in capturing requirements as well as 
identify interfaces and standards that must be incorporated to complete the architectural 
views. 
There is also a need to produce a mission needs statement (MNS), an initial 
capabilities document (ICD) and a CONOPS.  These documents are used to solidify 
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system requirements and gain Congress funding.  They can also be used as a basis for an 
initial request for proposal packages, if the system is to be designed and built by non-
DoD contractors. 
For the expert system to be effective for tracking there needs to be a successful 
system using some form of ITV.  Depending on the priority or needed fidelity, the best 
form of ITV may be either some form of passive or active RFID, or some technology 
such as GPS or some future technology that can be used to track items in the distribution 
system.  A trade study weighing the value of each of these technologies would be helpful 
to the success of the expert system. 
Probably one of the biggest improvements to this architecture for an expert 
system would be to incorporate a form of S&RL for some of the more predictable supply 
items.  Some of these could be monitored in near-real time and fed back into the system 
such that the Logistician is not required for more than monitoring the rate consumption.  
An example of this would be fuel.  Other things such as food or preventive maintenance 
parts are predictable within known usage rates.  For the preventive maintenance parts, 
there is a standard maintenance schedule for unit equipment.  The maintenance items will 
be needed on a regular basis.  By using the concept of S&RL, the maintenance parts can 
be pushed to the unit when they are scheduled to be needed.  This way, the end user has 
the part on hand when ready to perform the scheduled maintenance.  This will result in an 
increase in overall equipment availability for operational units. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In conclusion, though it is difficult to predict the added value of the use of an 
expert system for ordering and reordering supplies, it is clear that there are boundless 
potential benefits in its use.  This, coupled with the future research and trade studies 
discussed herein, could result in a superior logistics system to reduce the overall burden 
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Class Symbol Description Subclass 
I 
 
Subsistence, which includes rations and 
gratuitous health and welfare items. 
A–air (in0flight rations), C–combat 




Minor end items, which include clothing, 
individual equipment, tentage, organizational 
tool sets and tool kits, hand tools, and 
administrative and housekeeping supplies and 
equipment. 
B-ground support material, E-general 
supplies, F-clothing and textiles, M-
weapons, and T-industrial supplies 
(e.g., bearings, black and tackle, cable, 
chains, wire rope, screws, bolts, studs, 
steel rods, plates, bars). 
III 
 
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants, which include 
petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and 
insulating oils, preservatives, liquid and 
compressed gases, bulk chemical products, 
coolants, de-icing and antifreeze compounds 
and the components and additives of such 
products, and coal. 
A-air and W-ground (surface). 
IV 
 
Construction, which includes construction 
material, installed equipment, and all 




Ammunition of all types, which include 
chemical, biological, radiological, and special 
weapons, bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, 
detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, 
propellants, and other associated items. 
A-air and W-ground. 
VI 
 





Major end items, which are the final 
combination of end products assembled and 
configures in their intended form and ready for 
use (e.g., launchers, tanks, mobile machine 
shops and vehicles). 
A-air, B-ground support material 
(includes power generators and 
construction, barrier, bridging, 
firefighting, petroleum, and aping 
equipment), D-administrative vehicles 
(commercial vehicles used in 
administrative motor pools), G-
electronics, K-tactical vehicles, L-




Medical material, which includes medical 
unique repair parts. 
A-medical and/or dental material and 
B-blood and blood products. 
IX 
 
Repair parts, which include components and 
kits, assemblies and subassemblies (reparable 
and non-reparable) required for maintenance 
support of al equipment. 
A-air, B-ground support material, D-
administrative vehicles, G-electronics, 
K-tactical vehicles, L-missiles, M-




Nonmilitary material, which includes material 
to support nonmilitary programs (e.g., 
agriculture and economic development), that 
is not included in classes I – IX. 
 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
87 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Dr. John Osmundson 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
4. James Logue 
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 
Pascagoula, Mississippi 
 
5. Dave W. Whiddon 
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 
Pascagoula, Mississippi 
 
6. Dave T. Williams 
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 
Pascagoula, Mississippi 
 
7. Robert Rifley 
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 
Pascagoula, Mississippi 
 
8. Schuyler Otis Bland Library  
United States Merchant Marine Academy 
Kings Point, New York 
